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Highlights: 
 I examine how structural industry characteristics affect the magnitude of the 
welfare effect of collusion 
 The theory is consistent with evidence from a natural experiment of policy 
reform, the introduction of cartel law in the UK in the late 1950s 
 Price-cost margins declined after the breakdown of cartels in low-capital and 
larger-sized industries relative to capital-intensive and smaller-sized ones 
 The welfare loss from collusive pricing may be relatively small in certain 
types of industries where collusion often occurs in practice 
 
Abstract: In a differentiated oligopoly model with free entry, the static welfare loss 
from collusion is larger the lower the entry cost, the larger the market size and the 
higher the degree of product differentiation. The cartel overcharge is larger the 
lower the entry cost and the larger the market size, and is independent of the degree 
of product differentiation. These theoretical results are consistent with evidence 
from a natural experiment of policy reform, the introduction of cartel law in the UK 
in the late 1950s. Price-cost margins declined after the breakdown of cartels in low-
capital and larger-sized industries relative to capital-intensive and smaller-sized 
ones. There is weaker evidence of a fall in price-cost margins in consumer good and 
advertising-intensive relative to producer good and low-advertising industries. 
Crucially, these effects are not observed for industries not affected by the cartel  law. 
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A comparison of these findings with evidence on the incidence of collusion suggests 
that the welfare loss from collusive pricing may often be smaller in industries where 
cartels tend to form than in those where collusion is more difficult to sustain. 
 
JEL classification: L13, D43, L11, L60 
Keywords: Collusion, cartels, free entry, welfare, profitability, UK manufacturing, 
antitrust policy 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the large theoretical and empirical literature on cartels and collusion, the 
effect of structural industry characteristics on the magnitude of the welfare loss from 
collusive pricing has not been much examined. This is surprising, as there are 
obvious policy implications from identifying the types of industries where collusion 
can be expected to be most detrimental for welfare. This paper first presents some 
theoretical results on this question using a simple model of a differentiated product 
oligopoly. It then confronts the theoretical predictions with evidence from a unique 
natural experiment: the abolition of British price-fixing cartels in the 1960s. 
A central feature of the model, and one that distinguishes it from most of the 
existing theoretical literature, is that it allows for free (but costly) entry. This is 
consistent with the fact that, although entry deterrence by cartel members is possible 
in principle (Harrington 1989, 1991), most cartels have difficulty in effectively 
deterring entry in practice (Levenstein and Suslow 2006a). For instance, in a survey 
of 16 major cartels, Levenstein and Suslow (2004) report that entry occurred and 
was accommodated in 10 out of the 12 cases for which they had relevant 
information. This is in line with the fact, discussed in more detail in section 3, that 
the large majority of the British cartels did not restrict entry. It may be asked why 
collusion should occur, especially when it is illegal, if profits are to be driven to 
(almost) zero by entry. One reason is that there are short-run gains from collusion 
among a given number of firms, even if these gains are eventually eliminated by 
entry. Furthermore, collusion may persist once it is established, even when it no 
longer generates supra-normal profits for the average cartel member, because its 
breakdown will result in short-run losses and even exit for many firms. 
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The literature on the determinants of market structure has emphasised that, 
under free entry, collusion generally leads to a less concentrated market structure 
than competition (Selten 1984, Sutton 1991, Symeonidis 2000a, 2000b, 2002a). This 
raises the question as to whether welfare results derived from models with a fixed 
number of firms carry over to models with endogenous market structure. Fershtman 
and Pakes (2000) have shown that semi-collusion has an ambiguous effect on 
welfare in a model that allows for free entry. However, they do not examine the case 
of full collusion or how the welfare implications depend on exogenous industry 
characteristics. Brander and Spencer (1985) have derived more conventional welfare 
results in a model of collusion that allows for a two-way link between the number of 
firms and a reduced-form competition measure (a conjectural variations parameter), 
but do not analyse how these results vary with industry characteristics. 
I adopt a reduced-form theoretical approach in the present paper, aiming to 
illustrate the main forces at play and derive empirically testable predictions rather 
than carry out an elaborate analysis of collusion. The firms’ choice variable, 
following the decision to enter or not, is the level of output, and perfect collusion is 
always achieved irrespective of market structure. The assumption of perfect 
collusion may seem strong, but it is not crucial. What is probably more important is 
the exogeneity of collusion, in the sense that the ability of cartels to achieve a higher 
or lower degree of collusion is not significantly affected by structural industry 
characteristics. This does not seem implausible in the context of the British cartels 
of the 1950s, which were legal, long-standing and in most cases operated by 
industrial trade associations facilitating the coordination, monitoring and 
enforcement of collusion. I will return to this issue when I describe the model in the 
next section, and again when I discuss the effectiveness of the British cartels in 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 4 
section 3, and finally in my concluding remarks, where I will argue that relaxing this 
assumption actually strengthens my results. 
In this stylised model collusive pricing unambiguously reduces static welfare, 
as in most of the literature, and my main objective is to identify the types of 
industries where these adverse welfare implications are more pronounced. A set of 
clear results emerge: the welfare loss from collusion is larger the lower the entry 
cost, the larger the size of the market and the higher the degree of product 
differentiation. Furthermore, the cartel overcharge, defined here as the difference 
between the collusive and the competitive price allowing for the endogeneity of 
market structure, is larger the lower the entry cost and the larger the market size, and 
is independent of the degree of product differentiation. 
The second part of the paper confronts these theoretical predictions with 
evidence from a natural experiment of policy reform. As a result of the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act in the UK, restrictive agreements among firms, 
covering a wide range of manufacturing industries, were cancelled. This caused a 
breakdown of collusion across many industries in the 1960s. However, industries 
which were already competitive were not affected by the law. Furthermore, and 
consistent with the model, entry had not been restricted in most collusive British 
industries. Note that the introduction of cartel law in the UK was an exogenous and 
measurable institutional change. The inter-temporal structure of the data (spanning a 
time period both before and after the abolition of cartels) and the exogeneity of the 
institutional change allow us to largely overcome any concerns about potential 
biases in the estimated effects of collusion caused by its links with other variables. 
Although it is difficult to measure changes in welfare directly, it is possible 
to use information on the evolution of industry price-cost margins in previously 
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collusive industries either as a proxy for changes in static welfare following the 
abolition of cartels or as a measure of the cartel overcharge. I find that a relative 
decline in price-cost margins following the breakdown of cartels occurred in 
precisely the types of industries where my model predicts the welfare loss from 
collusion and the cartel overcharge to be larger. Crucially, these effects are not 
observed in industries not affected by the 1956 legislation, which confirms that they 
were indeed driven by the breakdown of cartels rather than by some other factor. 
A number of recent empirical surveys have reported large positive effects of 
many cartels on prices and profits (Connor and Bolotova 2006, Connor 2014, 
Levenstein and Suslow 2006a, Boyer and Kotchoni 2015), although this is by no 
means a general result and several authors find small or non-existent effects (Asch 
and Seneca 1976, O’Brien et al. 1979, Symeonidis 2002a). However, the present 
paper does not seek to address the question of the magnitude of price effects of 
collusion or the effect of competition on profitability in general, and focuses instead 
on the related but different question of the structural industry characteristics that 
determine the magnitude of the welfare effect of cartels. Levenstein and Suslow 
(2004, 2006) point out that there is considerable variation in the extent to which 
cartels succeed in raising prices and some of this seems to be driven by idiosyncratic 
factors. Nevertheless, a small number of previous empirical studies have examined 
how various systematic factors – such as internal cartel organisation and duration, 
the geographic region of operation, market concentration, and the legal environment 
– affect the magnitude of cartel overcharges (Griffin 1989, Connor and Bolotova 
2006, Bolotova 2009, Bolotova et al. 2007, 2009). One of the most comprehensive 
studies is Bolotova (2009), which combines theory and evidence from a cross-
section of over 400 cartels going as far back as the 18 th century. Bolotova, who uses 
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a model of a homogeneous good industry with a fixed number of firms, finds 
evidence that cartel overcharges are higher for international compared to domestic 
cartels, in Europe and the United States compared to the rest of the world, in 
industries with fewer firms and when outside competition is weak, for older cartels, 
and in environments where competition policy is not strict. 
The present research complements the previous literature in several ways. My 
theoretical results are derived using a differentiated oligopoly model with free ent ry 
that allows for a direct link between theory and evidence. My sample is not large, 
but it is a panel, it is far more homogeneous than those used in most previous 
studies, and it is virtually free from selection bias, because it contains all British 
manufacturing cartels of the 1950s and 1960s and not only those that have been 
detected or prosecuted. My dependent variable is profitability rather than price. 
Finally, I focus on a set of factors for whose effect on cartel profitability little is 
known, namely exogenous industry characteristics such as the level of entry costs, 
market size and the degree of product differentiation. 
There are more aspects to welfare than static allocative efficiency and the 
price-cost margin. Price collusion may influence product quality and variety, 
innovation and productivity, and it certainly affects market structure (for evidence 
on these effects in the context of the British cartels, see Symeonidis 2000a, 2000b, 
2002a, 2008a). I discuss this issue and several other extensions or potential concerns 
in the final section of the paper. I also compare my findings with evidence on the 
industry characteristics that facilitate cartel formation and conclude that the welfare 
loss from collusive pricing may be relatively small in the types of industries where 
collusion most often occurs in practice. 
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 7 
2. The model 
Consider an industry producing a potentially infinite number of varieties of a 
horizontally differentiated product. Competition is described by a two-stage game as 
follows. There are N0 potential entrants, each with the capacity to produce a single 
variety of the product. At stage 1, they decide whether or not to enter at an 
exogenously given sunk cost of entry f. At stage 2, those firms that have entered set 
quantities. N0 is sufficiently large, so that at any equilibrium of the game there is at 
least one non-entering firm. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of production c. 
Preferences are described by the utility function of a representative consumer 
  MxxxxU j
i ij
i
i
ii  

 2
2
21  (1) 
(see Dixit 1979, Vives 1985, Shaked and Sutton 1990, Sutton 1997, 1998, 
Symeonidis 2002a, 2002b, among others).1 The xi are the quantities demanded of the 
different varieties of the product in question, while  i ii xpYM denotes 
expenditure on outside goods. This utility function implies that the consumer spends 
only a small part of her income on the industry’s product (which also ensures that the 
maximisation of U has an interior solution) and hence income effects on the industry 
under consideration can be ignored and partial equilibrium analysis can be applied. The 
parameter , (0,2), is an inverse measure of the degree of horizontal product 
differentiation: in the limit as   0 the goods become independent, while in the limit 
as   2 they become perfect substitutes. The parameter  is a basic taste parameter 
                                                 
1 This demand system was introduced by Bowley (1924). A different type of quadratic utility 
function, which includes the number of firms as a parameter, was proposed by Shapley and 
Shubik (1969) and was also used in slightly different form in Shubik (1980). However, the 
Bowley demand system is a natural choice in the present context, where the number of firms is 
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which can be seen as an industry-specific measure of the degree to which demand is 
diversified among users with different preferences or requirements. Finally, 1, where 
1 > c, and 2 are positive scale parameters. 
 The inverse demand for variety i is given by 



ij
jii xxp  221 2  (2) 
in the region of quantity spaces where prices are positive. Let N denote the number 
of varieties offered. This is also the number of firms that have entered the industry at 
stage 1 of the game. 
 At stage 2, firms compete by setting quantities. Let each firm choose xi to 
maximise   ij jii ,  where iii xcp )(   and the parameter  can take 
two values, namely either  = 0 (corresponding to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium) or 
 = 1 (corresponding to perfect collusion). In a more general formulation,  could also 
take intermediate values between 0 and 1 to represent partial or imperfect collusion by 
way of a reduced-form parameter (see Shubik 1980, Symeonidis 2002a, 2008b). To 
keep the welfare analysis simple, I only consider a comparison of the Cournot-Nash and 
the perfect collusion cases here. The welfare results derived below are also valid if 
collusion is imperfect, at least when the collusive equilibrium is in the neighbourhood of 
the joint monopoly outcome. Since I mainly focus on comparing welfare properties of 
different competition regimes, I will take these regimes as exogenous. The exogeneity 
of  with respect to the number of firms N and other parameters of the model is 
consistent with the well-known multiplicity of possible equilibria in models of infinitely 
repeated games. Furthermore, it is justifiable in empirical contexts where significant 
                                                                                                                                               
endogenous and therefore its inclusion as a parameter in the utility function would be 
inappropriate. 
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changes in the competition regime occur as a result of exogenous institutional changes 
such as economic integration or the introduction of effective cartel policy.2 
Solving the system of N symmetric first-order conditions, we obtain the 
equilibrium quantity sold and profit of each firm in the second-stage subgame as a 
function of N. In particular, for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ( = 0) we obtain 
 
,
)1(4
)(
2
1



N
c
NxC


     
 
,
)1(4
)(2
)(
2
2
2
1



N
c
NC


   (3) 
whereas at the perfectly collusive (joint monopoly) point ( = 1) we have 
 
,
)1(22
)(
2
1



N
c
Nx JM


     
 
.
)1(24
)(
)(
2
2
1



N
c
NJM


   (4) 
It can be easily checked that in both cases (N) is decreasing in N for N > 1, and that 
JM(N) > C(N). 
The long-run equilibrium number of firms in the industry, N*, is determined 
at stage 1 by the free entry condition ,*)( fN   assuming for simplicity that N is a 
continuous variable. Using (3), (4) and the free entry condition we obtain, for  = 0, 
f
ffc
N C


2
221 42)(
1*

   (5) 
and, for  = 1, 
.
4
8)(
1*
2
2
2
1
f
fc
N JM

 
   (6) 
                                                 
2 In principle, one could think of  as a function of an exogenous institutional variable and a 
vector of other variables, which may include N. The present model would then be appropriate 
for a situation where the dominant influence on  is a change in the institutional variable, since 
in such a setup it would be plausible to assume that any feedback effects from N and other 
variables on  are small and can therefore be ignored. 
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In both cases f must be sufficiently low to ensure that N*  2. I will often make use 
of a weaker restriction on f in what follows, namely  
,
8
)(
0
2
2
1

 c
f

   (7) 
which implies N* > 1. Since both C(N) and JM(N) are decreasing in N and JM(N) > 
C(N), it follows that N*C < N*JM.3 
This result raises the possibility that static welfare is higher under collusion 
because the number of varieties is then larger even though each firm sells a lower 
quantity than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. However, this is not the case here. 
Because of the free entry zero-profit condition, total welfare is equal to consumer 
surplus, which is given by 
,*)1*(
2
1
1*
****)1*(*
2
1
)**(**
2
2
2
2
2
21
xNN
xpNxNNxxNW












  (8) 
where use has also been made of the inverse demand function. Substituting the 
expressions for x* = x(N*) and N* into W*, we obtain, for Cournot-Nash behaviour, 
   ffcffc
f
W C 221221
2
22)()4(2)(
4
1
* 

    (9) 
and, under perfect collusion, 
.
8
)2(4)(
*
2
2
2
1

 fc
W JM

   (10) 
                                                 
3 In a more general formulation where  can take any value between 0 and 1, it is easy to check 
that (N) is decreasing in N and increasing in . It follows from the total differential of the free 
entry condition that, for any [0,1), dN*/d > 0, i.e. the equilibrium number of firms increases 
with the degree of collusion. For  = 1, (N) is maximised, and so is N*. 
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Thus: 
    ,2)3(2)(322)(
8
1
*** 2121
2
fcfcWWW JMC 

   (11) 
which is a positive expression, given (7). We can therefore conclude: 
Proposition 1. Static welfare is lower under perfect collusion than in the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. 
 We can now examine how changes in the parameters of the model affect the 
magnitude of the welfare loss from collusion. We have: 
 
,0
8
)3(82)6)((*
2
221





f
ffc
f
W


   (12) 
,0
4
2)6()(3
)(
*
2
21
1








fc
c
W
  (13) 
 
0
8
2)6()(3)(*
2
2
211
2








fccW   (14) 
and 
 
,0
8
22)(3*
2
2
2
21








fcW   (15) 
for (0,2) and given (7). To summarise: 
Proposition 2. The welfare loss from collusion is larger the lower the entry cost f, the 
larger the size of the market (i.e. the larger the value of 1 or the smaller the value of 
2), and the higher the degree of product differentiation (the smaller the value of ). 
The intuition for Proposition 2 hinges on the way changes in the parameters 
of the model affect the equilibrium number of firms and total quantity sold in the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium and under collusion. Thus, for instance, a fall in f causes 
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the number of firms and total quantity sold to rise under both regimes. However, a 
fall in f increases N*JM  N*C and x*CN*C  x*JMN*JM, i.e. it makes the outcomes 
under the two regimes more dissimilar. Note that x*N* is more sensitive to changes 
in f under Cournot behaviour than under collusion even though the opposite is the 
case for N*. This is because the overall effect of a change in f on total quantity sold 
is dominated by the effect on the quantity sold by each firm (which is itself also 
dependent on N) rather than the direct effect on the number of firms. As a result, a 
fall in f causes the difference between x*CN*C and x*JMN*JM to increase even though 
it has a weaker effect on N*C than on N*JM. As the difference between x*CN*C and 
x*JMN*JM increases, so does the difference between W*C and W*JM. 
Note that the negative effect of f on the welfare loss from collusion is not a mere 
consequence of the fact that (i) a fall in f increases N* and (ii) the welfare loss from 
collusion increases in N. The reason is that the effect of f on N*, although always 
negative, is larger in absolute value under collusion than in the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. In other words, as f falls, N*C increases by less than N*JM. Therefore, 
although W*C and W*JM will both rise, it is not clear which will rise by more. As it turns 
out, a fall in f increases the difference between W*C and W*JM, even though it raises N*C 
by less than N*JM. This point is important because it helps to dispel a potential criticism 
of the theoretical results derived here, namely that it may be “obvious” that the welfare 
loss from collusion will be greater in a market with more firms (as when market size is 
larger, the product more differentiated, or the entry cost lower), because the collusive 
outcome is always the same whereas the Cournot outcome becomes more competitive 
as the number of firms increases. This criticism is not valid because of free entry: the 
direction of the change in W* cannot be known a priori when N* also changes. 
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Finally, I calculate how changes in the parameters of the model affect the 
difference between the joint monopoly price and the Cournot price, and therefore 
also the difference in the respective profit margins, when we allow for free entry. 
From (3)-(5) we obtain 
,2* 2 fcp
C    (16) 
,
2
)(
* 1
c
cp JM



  (17) 
and therefore 
,2
2
)(
*** 2
1 f
c
ppp CJM 



   (18) 
which is positive, because of (7). It is easy to verify: 
Proposition 3. The difference between the collusive price and the Cournot price is 
larger the lower the entry cost f, the larger the size of the market (i.e. the larger the 
value of 1 or the smaller the value of 2), and is independent of the degree of product 
differentiation. 
Note that the negative effect of market size on W* obtained earlier is not a trivial 
scale effect; an increase in market size raises the cartel overcharge p* too.  
Most of these results are likely to carry over to more general settings, except 
for the independence of p* from , which may be specific to the linear demand 
model. It is easy to check that the difference between the total Cournot quantity sold 
and the total collusive quantity sold decreases in , but this is exactly balanced by 
the effect of  on N* to yield the independence result for p*. One way to interpret 
this finding is to say that the degree of product differentiation could have an 
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ambiguous effect on the cartel overcharge in more general settings, but that any such 
effect would not be strong and might be difficult to detect empirically.4 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
Explicit restrictive agreements among firms were widespread in British industry in the 
mid-1950s: nearly half of manufacturing industry was subject to price fixing. The 
agreements were not enforceable at law, but they were not illegal. Most of them 
provided for minimum or fixed producer prices. There were generally no restrictions 
on longer-term strategic decisions such as investment in capacity, advertising or 
R&D. A description of the institutional changes and the evolution of competition 
from the 1950s to the early 1970s and a detailed survey of restrictive agreements 
across all British manufacturing industries can be found in Symeonidis (2002a). Here 
I summarise the evidence and describe the construction of the dataset for this paper. 
The 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act required the registration of restrictive 
agreements, including verbal or implied arrangements, on goods. Registered agreements 
should be abandoned, unless they were either successfully defended in the Restrictive 
Practices Court as producing benefits that outweighed the presumed detriment or 
cleared by the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements as not significantly affecting 
competition. Because the attitude of the Court could not be known until the first cases 
had been heard, the large majority of industries registered their agreements rather than 
dropping or secretly continuing them. The first agreements came before the Court in 
                                                 
4 The independence of p* from  also depends on the assumption that  is exogenous, as 
previously discussed. In circumstances where a higher degree of product differentiation implies 
a lower degree of collusion, the independence result for p* would not hold. A higher degree of 
differentiation (a smaller value of ) would then be associated with a decrease in the cartel 
overcharge. 
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1959 and were struck down. This induced most industries to abandon their agreements 
rather than incur the costs of a Court case with little hope of success. 
Was entry generally free in collusive industries? The evidence from the 
agreements registered under the 1956 Act, several industry reports published by the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission during the 1950s and a large 
number of case studies discussed in Swann et al. (1973, 1974) suggests that entry 
was in most cases free, i.e. only subject to standard entry costs that would also apply 
in the absence of collusion. Most agreements were operated by industrial trade 
associations and there were often no significant restrictions on association 
membership, so that entry would not be difficult if the entrant was willing to become 
a party to the agreement. For instance, only for four out of 14 collusive industries 
investigated by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission in the 1950s, 
which operated some of the most restrictive agreements across all British industries, 
did the Commission report evidence of restricted cartel membership.5 Furthermore, 
the reports of the Monopolies Commission and the case studies in Swann et al. 
contain information on profitability of firms in collusive industries: profits were 
more often described as “reasonable” than “excessive”, and this was due to the fact 
that cartel firms could not defend excessive profits against entry. Finally, Symeonidis 
(2000a, 2002a) has documented that a significant restructuring occurred in previously 
                                                 
5 Free cartel membership is not the same as free entry into the collusive industry. In many cases, 
however, the former implies the latter because many of the entry deterrence mechanisms used 
by cartels, such as collective exclusive dealing or aggregated discounts to distributors, are 
essentially attempts to restrict competition from outside firms and are not very effective if cartel 
membership is free. In fact, such practices were used by several British cartels, but they were 
often not effective in deterring entry. Part of the reason for this may be the fact that although in 
some industries the existing association members might reject certain applications for 
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collusive British industries as a result of the 1956 Act, with mergers and exit of firms 
causing, on average, the five-firm concentration ratio to increase by about 6 percentage 
points and the number of firms to fall by about 15% between 1958 and the mid-1970s. It 
would be difficult to explain such a strong impact of cartel policy on market structure if 
cartel firms had generally been able to maintain high profits by deterring entry, since in 
that case many more firms would have been able to survive albeit with reduced 
profitability rather than be driven to exit. 
Were the agreements effective? Or could the lack of excessive profits be 
simply due to ineffective cartels rather than free entry? The effectiveness of an 
agreement depended on two factors: the extent to which the parties themselves 
conformed to it and the extent of competition from outside firms, domestic or 
foreign. Evidence from the registered agreements, the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Practices Commission reports, the Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of 
industrial trade associations and Swann et al. (1973, 1974) suggests that in most 
industries the agreements had been operated effectively prior to cancellation, the parties 
typically accounted for a large fraction of the market and contained the largest and best-
known domestic firms, and outside competition was usually weak. For instance, Swann 
et al. (1974) report cartel market shares of 90% or higher in about two thirds of the 
cases they examine, and 75% or higher in all but two cases. Competition from imports 
was often limited as a result of tariffs and quantitative controls, differing technical 
standards, transport costs or international restrictive agreements. Finally, the legality 
                                                                                                                                               
membership, they would normally accommodate any powerful non-member firm rather than 
face strong outside competition. 
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of the agreements and the institutional role of the trade associations that operated 
them had facilitated the coordination, monitoring and enforcement of collusion.6 
To what extent did collusion break down following the abolition of cartels? 
Evidence from various sources indicates that price competition intensified in the short 
run in many industries. However, in many others, agreements to exchange information 
on prices, price changes and so on replaced the former explicit collusive arrangements, 
and price competition emerged only after these information agreements were abandoned 
in the mid-1960s, following adverse decisions of the Restrictive Practices Court. Price 
wars occurred in a number of previously collusive industries in the second half of the 
1960s, and the final blow came with the provisions of the 1968 Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act regarding information agreements.7 In many industries, therefore, 
competition emerged more than a decade after the introduction of the 1956 legislation. 
Overall, sooner or later the large majority of industries with restrictive agreements in the 
1950s did experience a breakdown of collusion as a result of the 1956 Act.  
Although my main source of data on competition are the agreements registered 
under the 1956 Act, I also use other sources to identify unregistered agreements, 
including the industry reports of the Monopolies Commission, the 1955 Monopolies 
                                                 
6 Genesove and Mullin (2001) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006b) describe other instances 
where communication and monitoring within trade associations has facilitated collusion. 
7 Information agreements were not registrable under the 1956 Act, unless it could be shown that 
they were being used as a way to continue a formally abandoned explicit collusive scheme. In 
two important cases brought before the Restrictive Practices Court in the mid-1960s, prices and 
price changes had consistently been notified in advance of coming into effect, and the prices of 
different firms had always been identical. The Court concluded that these agreements amounted 
to the same effect as explicit price fixing, and ruled against the parties. These Court rulings 
induced several more industries with information agreements to cancel them. A few years later, 
the 1968 Restrictive Trade Practices Act made certain types of information agreements 
registrable. By the time they were called up for registration, most had already been abandoned. 
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Commission report on collective discrimination, the 1949 report of the Lloyds’ 
Committee on resale price maintenance, industry studies contained in Burn (1958) and 
Hart et al. (1973), the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and the 
Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of trade associations (including 
unpublished background material for this survey). The use of a diverse range of sources 
guarantees that any potential measurement error caused by ineffective agreements or 
unknown cases of collusion in the data is very small.  
The data on profitability and other variables are available for industries 
defined at the three-digit level of aggregation (i.e. “minimum list heading” industries 
of the UK Census of Production), although I have sometimes used available data at 
the four-digit industry level. The three-digit level of aggregation defines a total of 
about 130 UK manufacturing industries and has been often used in studies with 
British or international data on profitability (for instance, Cowling and Waterson 
1976, Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki 1988) or productivity growth (Symeonidis 2008a). 
All manufacturing industries were classified as collusive, competitive or ambiguous 
according to their state of competition in the 1950s on the basis of three criteria: the 
reliability of the data source; the types of restrictions; and the proportion of an 
industry's total sales revenue covered by products subject to agreements and, for 
each product, the fraction of the UK market covered by cartel firms. In particular, 
the various types of restrictions were classified as significant, not significant or 
uncertain, according to their likely impact on competition. Next, the products that 
were subject to agreements were assigned to the industry categories used. An 
industry was classified as collusive in the 1950s if the products subject to significant 
restrictions accounted for more than 50% of total industry sales. It was classified as 
competitive if the products subject to significant or uncertain restrictions accounted 
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for less than 20% of industry sales. I have used the 50% cut-off point because in 
some cases most core industry products were subject to price fixing, although some 
were not; clearly, one would expect a significant impact of the 1956 Act in such 
cases. I have used the 20% cut-off point because in some cases secondary industry 
products were subject to restrictive agreements, although core products were not. 
Variations in these cut-off points (for instance, using 60% instead of 50%, or 10% 
instead of 20%) do not significantly affect the results.8 I have excluded a few 
industries which remained collusive or partially collusive throughout the period 
under study and those with significant government participation or intervention. 
This procedure resulted in a panel consisting of 36 industries, listed in 
Appendix 1, with a clear change of competition regime and five years: 1954, 1958, 
1963, 1968 and 1973. The first four of these are the only ones in the 1950s and 
1960s for which comparable data on price-cost margins are available, and 1973 is 
the last year before the oil crisis of the 1970s. I will also use for comparison a 
control group of 55 industries which were competitive in the 1950s and therefore 
were not significantly affected by the 1956 law. Note that although the cartel law 
was introduced in 1956, it was not until 1959 that industries started cancelling their 
agreements. And since competition was often slow to emerge, as pointed out above, 
the 1956 Act had an impact well into the late 1960s and even early 1970s. 
It is difficult to measure changes in welfare directly, but it is possible to use 
information on the evolution of price-cost margins across different classes of 
previously collusive industries either as a proxy for the change in static welfare 
                                                 
8 In fact, out of 36 industries classified as collusive 20 had agreements covering all or nearly all 
industry products and most of the others had agreements covering more than 75% of total 
industry sales. The use of a continuous competition measure instead of cut-off points has proved 
impractical for a variety of reasons (see Symeonidis 2002a). 
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following the breakdown of cartels or as a measure of the cartel overcharge. Note 
that the cartel overcharge is usually defined as the difference between the collusive 
and the competitive price, whereas I focus in this and the following section on the 
difference between the collusive and the competitive price-cost margin. However, 
the qualitative results will always be similar for these two measures, and the 
quantitative results should also be similar for the proportional change in the price 
and the price-cost margin, at least if marginal cost is largely exogenous. 
Furthermore, in practice neither the industry price index nor the quantity sold would 
be a valid measure of welfare over a 20-year period, because changes in the former 
might largely reflect exogenous changes in costs, while the latter would be mainly 
driven by demand. I follow the standard definition of the price-cost margin, PCM, in 
the literature, as the net value of output (or value added) minus wages and salaries 
divided by sales revenue (see, for instance, Collins and Preston 1969, Cowling and 
Waterson 1976, Machin and Van Reenen 1993). PCM was constructed from Census 
of Production data and any limitations of these are greatly alleviated here by the use 
of panel data and the fact that my results are based on changes in PCM, not levels. 
The industry capital-labour ratio, K/L, is the best available proxy for the level of 
entry cost: since the entry cost is primarily the cost of installing capital (plant and 
machinery), capital-intensive industries are typically those with significant entry costs 
and vice versa. For product differentiation, I will use two different empirical measures: 
the advertising-sales ratio and a consumer good-producer good indicator. Both have 
often been used as proxies for product differentiation in the empirical industrial 
organisation and international trade literatures, including studies of collusion. Finally, 
the industry sales revenue is the best available measure of market size. It may be argued 
that to the extent that some industries comprise a number of submarkets that are largely 
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independent, sales revenue may be affected by the degree of within-industry 
heterogeneity. The list of industries in Appendix 1 comprises a few to which this 
objection may apply; note that any measurement error might only cause the estimated 
coefficients to understate somewhat the magnitude of the effect of market size on PCM. 
To mitigate potential endogeneity and measurement error problems and to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results, I will use the primary data to construct a set of 
binary variables designed to split the sample of industries into categories or groups 
according to their characteristics. My motivation is as follows. Take, for instance, the 
advertising-sales ratio: although it is endogenous, it is largely exogenous characteristics 
that will determine whether it is above or below 1% in any given industry. Thus for an 
industry below the 1% cut-off point there is not much scope for using advertising to 
promote a differentiated product. The opposite is true for an industry above the 1% cut-
off point. Of course, whether in such a case the advertising-sales ratio will be 3% or 5%, 
say, may be largely determined endogenously. But a binary variable is not very 
sensitive to endogenous factors that affect advertising intensity. In fact, a comparison of 
advertising-sales ratios across various years reveals very few instances in my dataset 
where an industry moves from below 1% to above 1% or vice versa. A similar argument 
can be made with respect to the capital-labour ratio or sales revenue. Measurement error 
is an additional issue both for sales revenue as a proxy for market size, as discussed 
above, and for the capital-labour ratio: the capital stock figures are estimates rather 
than primary data, more reliable for measuring changes than levels (see Oulton and 
O’Mahony 1990), and a binary variable may help reduce the effect of measurement 
error on the econometric estimates. 
I construct four variables: LOWCAPINT, which is equal to 1 for industries with 
1958 capital-labour ratio lower than the average across all manufacturing industries and 
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0 otherwise; ADV, which is equal to 1 for industries with 1958 advertising-sales ratio 
higher than 1% and 0 otherwise; PRODCON, which takes the values 0 for industries 
producing primarily producer goods and 1 for industries producing primarily consumer 
goods; and MKTSIZE, which is equal to 1 for industries with 1958 sales revenue higher 
than the average across all manufacturing industries and 0 otherwise. Each of these 
variables takes the value of 0 or 1 for each industry, not for each individual observation 
(industry-year pair). The year 1958 was chosen because it is the last in my sample when 
all the cartels were still in place, and the scope for a decline in PCM in any given 
industry must depend on initial conditions. The classification of industries would 
change very little if another year were chosen instead or if the median capital-labour 
ratio and sales revenue were used rather than the mean to construct LOWCAPINT and 
MKTSIZE, respectively. Details on the classification of industries are provided in 
Appendix 1 and on data sources in Appendix 2. 
Following the theoretical results of section 2, I expect PCM to unambiguously 
fall after the breakdown of collusion in industries where LOWCAPINT and MKTSIZE 
take the value 1 relative to industries where they take the value 0. I also expect no 
change or a modest fall in PCM in industries where ADV and PRODCON are equal to 1 
relative to industries where these variables are equal to 0. 
Descriptive statistics on initial levels of PCM are presented in Table 1 for 
collusive as well as competitive industries and also for groups of collusive industries 
according to their capital intensity, advertising intensity, producer good-consumer 
good index and market size. There are no significant differences across the various 
rows of Table 1, and this applies even more to the 1954-1958 change in PCM than to 
its level. One should not read too much into a comparison of the levels anyway. For 
instance, the fact that PCM is slightly lower, on average, in collusive than in 
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competitive industries is partly due to the fact that low-advertising and low-R&D 
industries had, on the whole, lower price-cost margins and higher incidence of 
collusion than advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive ones. Much more 
informative for our purposes are the 1954-1958 changes in PCM. One may conclude, 
on the basis of these figures, that any differences observed after 1958 across 
industry groups should be attributed to the 1956 cartel law only and are not biased 
by any divergent pre-existing trends. 
 
4. Econometric evidence 
The econometric specifications used in this paper are panel data models with individual-
specific (industry) effects. In line with the theory, my basic specification for PCM is 
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I use a logarithmic transformation of PCM to facilitate the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients as the proportional change in the cartel overcharge, for the 
reasons discussed in the previous section. However, I have also performed robustness 
checks using the untransformed PCM as dependent variable. The year dummies, Y63, 
Y68 and Y73, are meant to capture various factors that have affected price-cost margins 
in this sample of industries over the period examined, in addition to the breakdown of 
collusion. These include cyclical fluctuations, the progressive opening of the British 
economy, the UK government’s prices and incomes policies in the 1960s and 
macroeconomic policy. It is difficult to assess these factors at the industry level, but it 
may be plausible to assume that their effect would have been more or less equally 
realised across all industries, or at least that there would be no systematic difference 
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across classes of industries according to their capital intensity, degree of product 
differentiation or market size. 
One potentially important determinant of PCM that I am able to control for is the 
capital-labour ratio, K/L: I expect a positive effect of this on the price-cost margin. The 
capital-labour ratio has often been used in profitability studies to control for the fact that 
the endogenous variable, the price-cost margin or the rate of return on capital, includes 
the gross return to capital. In the present study the capital-labour ratio is seen as a proxy 
for the cost of entry. This is not a real difference, however, since the entry cost is 
primarily the cost of installing capital (plant and machinery). 
The coefficients of primary interest are those on the interaction terms. The 
coefficient on LOWCAPINTY73 will test whether the change in PCM between the 
1950s and 1973 was different in previously collusive industries with LOWCAPINT = 1 
(i.e. relatively low-capital industries) than in industries with LOWCAPINT = 0, after 
controlling for the other exogenous variables. The coefficient on ADVY73 will 
compare the evolution of PCM between previously collusive advertising-intensive 
industries and low-advertising ones. Finally, the coefficient on MKTSIZEY73 will 
reveal whether the change in PCM was different in previously collusive industries with 
MKTSIZE = 1 (i.e. larger markets) than in those with MKTSIZE = 0. 
My approach is not meant to say anything about the level of price-cost margins. 
Rather I examine differences in the evolution of price-cost margins across classes of 
industries. My benchmark model does not include time dummies or interaction terms 
for either 1954 or 1958, the two years in the dataset when the collusive agreements were 
still in place. This approach helps to gloss over any fluctuations in PCM over 1954-
1958 – which, as shown in Table 1, are essentially random noise and not related to any 
effects of collusion – and should therefore provide an accurate estimate of the long-run 
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effect of competition on PCM. However, I will also present results using 1958 as the 
benchmark year to bring more sharply into focus the short-run effect of the 
breakdown of cartels. On the other hand, distinguishing between 1963, 1968 and 1973 
is important: since competition emerged slowly in many industries, it is best not to 
impose any structure on the data regarding the timing of the impact of the law on PCM. 
Table 2 contains the results from fixed effects regressions with robust standard 
errors. As the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data sometimes marginally 
rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation, alternative results obtained 
from a model with AR(1) disturbances are presented for some specifications. I begin 
with a regression of lnPCM on year dummies and the control variable ln(K/L). The 
coefficient on ln(K/L) is positive and statistically significant, as expected, a result that 
holds across all specifications. The second and third columns report the results from my 
benchmark specification, while the fourth column also includes lnNFIRMS among the 
regressors – where NFIRMS is the number of firms, the best available measure of 
market structure at the three-digit industry level over the period 1954-1973.9 The fifth 
column adds the year dummy and interactions for 1954. All these regressions provide 
clear evidence of a fall in the long run in the average price-cost margin of industries 
where LOWCAPINT, ADV and MKTSIZE take the value 1 relative to industries where 
these variables take the value 0: the coefficients on LOWCAPINTY73, ADVY73 and 
MKTSIZEY73 are all negative and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
                                                 
9 My specification is derived from a theoretical model in which the number of firms and the 
price-cost margin are both endogenous. However, I also report results from a regression that 
controls for market structure both as a robustness check and in order to obtain an indication of 
whether the welfare effects of collusion may be different in circumstances where entry is 
restricted and the number of firms fixed. The coefficient on lnNFIRMS can be interpreted as a 
correlation coefficient, although instrumenting lnNFIRMS with the log of deflated sales revenue 
gives very similar results. 
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Furthermore, the estimated effects are large, indicating average decreases in PCM of at 
least 15% in low-capital and larger-sized relative to capital-intensive and smaller-sized 
industries, as well as an average decrease in PCM of up to 15% in advertising-intensive 
relative to low-advertising industries. The last three columns replace ADV with 
PRODCON. Most of the results are similar, but the coefficients on the interaction terms 
with PRODCON are small and not statistically significant. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms (excluding those with PRODCON) are 
statistically significant for 1973 but usually not for 1963 or 1968. Several factors may 
help explain this result. As pointed out in section 3, competition took many years to 
emerge in a significant number of collusive industries and information agreements were 
often used to maintain implicit price fixing until the late 1960s. Import competition also 
intensified in the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, and this must have put 
pressure on firms in industries where domestic competition was still weak because of a 
history of collusive arrangements. Furthermore, several important changes during the 
1960s in the distribution of manufactured goods – such as the abolition of resale price 
maintenance following the introduction of the 1964 Resale Practices Act, the growth of 
large powerful retailers, and the rise of retailers’ own brands – reduced the role of brand 
advertising and the bargaining power of manufacturers and put pressure on their price-
cost margins (see Pickering 1974, Ward 1973, Mercer 2013). Resale price maintenance, 
in particular – which affected more than a third of consumer expenditure on goods in 
1964 and was not only prevalent in consumer goods but also existed across a range of 
intermediate products – must have delayed or hindered the emergence of effective price 
competition among manufacturers in several previously collusive advertising-intensive 
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industries.10 Its abolition in the second half of the 1960s may be an important factor 
behind the fall in PCM after 1968 in these industries. All in all, it is not surprising that 
the divergence in the evolution of PCM across classes of previously collusive industries 
is more pronounced in 1973 than in 1963 or 1968: the year 1973 may be the only 
unambiguously competitive one for many industries in the dataset. 
An intriguing feature of the results in Table 2 is the positive sign and statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the year dummies. This seems counterintuitive, but 
there are several factors that help to provide an explanation. First, as I have pointed out 
already, the capital stock figures are estimates rather than primary data. Since K/L was 
increasing across all industries throughout the period, it is correlated with the year 
dummies. So to the extent that there is measurement error in K/L, the effect of capital 
intensity on PCM is partly picked up by the year dummies. This effect is large: in 
regressions excluding ln(K/L), the magnitude of the coefficients on the time dummies 
more than doubles compared to regressions where ln(K/L) is included. Second, various 
economy-wide influences are captured by the year dummies and some of these may 
have been pushing price-cost margins upwards over time. Cyclical fluctuations could be 
one such factor – for instance, the British economy experienced a slowdown in 1958, 
whereas 1963 and 1968 were boom years. Third, it is by no means clear that there 
should be a strong negative effect of the breakdown of collusion on price-cost margins 
in the long run in industries where free entry and endogenous changes in market 
structure tend to drive profits (or profits of the least efficient firms) to zero irrespective 
of the competition regime. A full analysis of this point is beyond the scope of the 
                                                 
10 In fact, a secondary provision of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act was to strengthen 
manufacturers’ powers to enforce individual resale prices: this was seen at the time as an 
attempt to maintain a balance between large and small manufacturers in a context where the 
collective enforcement of prices was no longer possible. 
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present work, but the evidence reported in Symeonidis (2002a) suggests that a 
significant restructuring took place by way of mergers and exit of firms in previously 
collusive industries during the 1960s, which has tended to restore price-cost margins in 
the long run, at least on average.11 
Last but not least, the overall rise in industry profitability in the 1960s in my 
dataset may be more apparent than real. A preliminary analysis of the data revealed a 
large increase of the average reported PCM between 1958 and 1963. In particular, 
the average change in PCM for the 36 collusive industries was 0.03 in 1954-1958, 0.23 
in 1958-1963, 0.13 in 1963-1968 and 0.01 in 1968-1973. The corresponding figures for 
all industries are 0.02, 0.29, 0.06 and 0.01. The 1958-1963 jump in the reported PCM 
is difficult to explain by reference to any institutional or other exogenous factors and 
may be due to an unknown change in the way information was collected and certain 
variables (especially net output) computed for the 1963 and later Censuses as 
compared to the 1958 and earlier Censuses – in which case it can be regarded as a 
spurious but largely uniform shift across industries.12 More generally, although some 
of the changes in the reported PCM may be due to measurement error and factors not 
explicitly included in my specification, any such factors can be plausibly assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the structural industry characteristics I consider here, and therefore 
                                                 
11 Furthermore, price-cost margins may have increased during the 1960s and early 1970s in 
some previously collusive industries for reasons not captured by the symmetric cost model of 
section 2. In particular, more intense competition may have caused low-cost firms to expand 
at the expense of high-cost rivals; and since low-cost firms have higher profit margins than 
high-cost firms, this could have led to an increase in overall profitability in industries with 
large efficiency differences among firms. 
12 There is no such jump in UK profitability estimates based on company accounts – see, for 
instance, the statistics published in the November 1974 issue of Economic Trends. 
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would not affect my comparisons of different classes of industries, as described by the 
coefficients on the interaction terms. 
I performed a variety of robustness checks, some of which are presented in 
Table 3. These included: 1) replacing lnPCM by PCM as dependent variable in the first 
two columns of Table 3; 2) in the next three columns, classifying the industries as 
collusive when the products subject to significant restrictions accounted for more than 
60% of total industry sales (instead of 50%); 3) replacing the capital-labour ratio, K/L, 
by the capital stock of the average plant as a measure of entry costs; 4) controlling for 
R&D intensity interactions with the time dummies; and 5) adding the logs of deflated 
sales revenue, lnSALES, average plant size, lnSIZE, and union density, lnUNION (taken 
from Bain and Price 1980), as additional regressors in the last two columns of Table 3 – 
all three statistically insignificant. The results from these alternative specifications were 
broadly similar to those in Table 2 except that the coefficient on ADVY73 was usually 
no longer statistically significant at the 5% level. All in all, the econometric findings are 
consistent with the theory, which predicts an unambiguously positive effect of low 
entry costs and large market size and a small or ambiguous effect of product 
differentiation on the cartel overcharge. 
One final question may be asked: can we be certain that the effects described by 
the interaction terms are driven by the breakdown of collusion rather than by some other 
unspecified factors that apply not only to my sample of 36 previously collusive 
industries but to all industries? This concern is particularly relevant in light of the 
observed timing of the competition effect in the data, with much of the impact 
appearing to occur many years after the introduction of the cartel legislation, as well as 
the concerns about potential measurement error in PCM.  
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To address this issue I have performed a similar set of regressions for a control 
group of industries that did not experience a change of competition regime in the 1960s 
because they had never been subject to restrictive agreements to any significant degree. 
This sample consists of 55 industries classified as competitive according to the criteria 
described in section 3. The results from random effects regressions (the preferred model 
in most cases according to a standard Hausman test – with the results from fixed effects 
regressions being very similar) are collected in Table 4. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms are very different in this group compared to collusive industries. None 
of them is negative and statistically significant, and in fact most have the opposite sign 
than in Tables 2 and 3. I interpret this as strong evidence that the results described by 
the coefficients on the interaction terms in Tables 2 and 3 are indeed driven by the 
breakdown of cartels.13 
 
5. Discussion 
In a model of a differentiated product market with linear demand and free entry, 
collusion reduces static social welfare and the welfare loss is larger the lower the 
entry cost, the larger the size of the market, and the higher the degree of product 
                                                 
13 A comparison of Tables 2 and 4 suggests that if one were to argue that differences between 
collusive and competitive industries are a more accurate measure of the impact of the 
breakdown of cartels on PCM than the coefficients in Table 2, the case for a negative effect of 
entry costs and a positive effect of market size on the cartel overcharge would be strengthened, 
whereas the case for an effect of product differentiation on the cartel overcharge would be 
weaker. As a further robustness check I estimated regressions with the entire set of collusive and 
competitive industries using a difference-in-differences approach. To this end I defined a binary 
variable which takes the value 1 for industries with a change of competition regime and 0 
otherwise and used two-way and three-way interaction terms to capture differences across 
classes of industries according to their structural characteristics as well as differences between 
collusive and competitive industries. The results confirmed my earlier findings. 
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differentiation. The cartel overcharge is larger the lower the entry cost and the larger 
the market size, and is independent of the degree of product differentiation. The 
econometric estimates suggest average decreases in price-cost margins following the 
breakdown of collusive pricing in 1960s Britain of at least 15% in low-capital and 
larger-sized relative to capital-intensive and smaller-sized industries, respectively. 
There is weak evidence of a price-cost margin fall in advertising-intensive and 
consumer good relative to low-advertising and producer good industries. Note that 
the somewhat mixed evidence on the effect of product differentiation on the cartel 
overcharge is consistent with an unambiguously positive effect of product 
differentiation on the welfare loss from collusion. 
Admittedly, my theoretical model is stylised and the econometric analysis 
subject to data limitations that could somewhat “blur” the results – in particular, I 
cannot capture variations in the “degree of collusion” across industries or 
differences in the exact timing of cartel breakdown, since these cannot be 
determined from the available information. Nevertheless, the two sets of results, 
theoretical and empirical, are remarkably consistent with one another, and the 
contrast between the evolution of price-cost margins in collusive and competitive 
industries provides further support for my conclusions. 
 One might ask whether the theoretical results obtained from the present 
approach, which assumes free entry, are different from those that would be obtained 
if the number of firms were fixed. One reason why this is an important question is 
that short-run profits may be driving the decision of firms to collude under free 
entry, as pointed out in the Introduction. Another reason is that entry is sometimes 
restricted either by institutional factors or by the strategic behaviour of cartel firms. 
And still another reason is that some cartels, unlike the British ones of the 1950s, are 
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either short-lived or subject to frequent price wars, and in such circumstances high 
profitability during collusive periods may not attract entry. 
It is easy to check that when the number of firms is fixed in the model of 
section 2, both the cartel overcharge and the welfare loss from collusion increase in 
the number of firms and the size of the market. Note that to the extent that industries 
with low entry costs are less concentrated, lower entry costs will be associated with 
larger welfare losses from collusion even in the short run or when entry is restricted. 
However, the model with fixed number of firms also predicts that the welfare loss 
from collusion is larger for intermediate levels of product differentiation, unlike the 
free entry case. On the other hand, the econometric results are not at all sensitive to 
controlling for market structure, suggesting that the distinction between free and 
restricted entry may not be crucial in practice. All in all, from an antitrust 
perspective, most of my findings, and especially those on the role of entry costs and 
market size, are likely to be also of relevance for cartels operating in different 
circumstances than the British cartels of the 1950s. 
A potential concern with the econometric analysis is that the price-cost margin 
may be an imperfect proxy for welfare. In particular, differences in the evolution of the 
price-cost margin across industries would not accurately reflect welfare differences if 
they were mainly driven by endogenous changes in productivity or labour costs rather 
than price and industry sales. To check whether my empirical results might be subject to 
this problem, I have run regressions similar to those presented in Table 2 but with 
labour productivity and real wages rather than PCM as dependent variables. None of the 
interaction terms in these regressions was statistically significant. In other words, any 
changes in productivity or labour costs caused by the breakdown of British cartels were 
not more pronounced in certain types of industries than in others. It follows that the 
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observed differences in the evolution of PCM across types of industries in my data 
accurately reflect welfare differences. 
I should emphasise that the theoretical and empirical results of this paper relate 
to static welfare only. In assessing how the overall welfare implications of collusion 
may differ across industries, one would need to take into account the production and use 
of innovations, non-price variables such as product quality and variety, productivity and 
market structure. This task is beyond the scope of the present research. The available 
evidence from productivity regressions, as reported above and in Symeonidis (2008a), 
suggests that the British cartels slowed down labour productivity growth in the 1950s 
and that this effect was equally strong in all classes of industries. Furthermore, collusion 
led to excess entry (Symeonidis 2000a, 2000b, 2002a) and the 1956 law caused a 
significant rise in concentration and fall in firm numbers in low-advertising/R&D 
industries as well as in advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive industries. 
Another potential concern is that the assumption of perfect collusion may not be 
realistic. This will not matter much if the degree of collusion varies across industries 
due to idiosyncratic factors, without being correlated with any of the structural industry 
characteristics examined here. The assumption of perfect collusion is not crucial for the 
theoretical results provided the degree of collusion is exogenous with respect to the 
parameters of the model. For the econometric analysis, what is important is that the 
ability of cartels to raise prices above competitive levels is not correlated with 
exogenous industry characteristics. If, however, such a correlation existed, then the 
empirical results could be difficult to interpret. For instance, would the relative decline 
of price-cost margins in previously collusive low-capital industries relative to capital-
intensive ones that we observe in the data reflect the mechanism proposed in the 
theoretical model, i.e. the higher welfare loss from perfect collusion? Or would it rather 
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result from the ability of cartels operating in low-capital industries to raise prices closer 
to the joint monopoly level than cartels operating in capital-intensive industries?  
I cannot conclusively prove that my interpretation of the empirical results, which 
is in accordance with the predictions of the model, is correct, but I can offer two 
arguments to support it. The first is the context of the British cartels of the 1950s, 
described in section 3: the cartels were legal, long-standing, effective, usually 
comprising all or most of the important firms and facing limited outside competition, 
and they were typically operated by industrial trade associations which facilitated the 
coordination, monitoring and enforcement of collusion. In such circumstances, any 
differences across industries with respect to the degree of collusion may not be large. 
The second argument is that even if the British cartels were able to achieve 
prices closer to monopoly prices in certain types of industries than in others, the high-
degree-of-collusion industries would probably be those where collusion was more likely 
to occur and be sustainable. Several empirical studies indicate that collusion is more 
likely to occur in capital-intensive industries or those with high entry costs (see, for 
instance, Dick 1996). The evidence also suggests that collusion is hindered by product 
differentiation (Asch and Seneca 1975, Scherer and Ross 1990). Thus to the extent that 
the ability to raise prices considerably above competitive levels is positively correlated 
with the ability to form and sustain a cartel, low-capital, advertising-intensive and 
consumer good industries would have been subject to a lower degree of collusion than 
capital-intensive, low-advertising and producer good industries before the abolition of 
cartels. Consequently, they would have experienced a weaker effect on prices and 
welfare once collusion broke down. And yet what we see in the data is the exact 
opposite. Clearly, the evidence does not support the different-degrees-of-collusion story. 
Alternatively, if this story were true, then my econometric results would underestimate, 
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if anything, the effects described in the theoretical model. I would then have to conclude 
that these effects are so strong that they dominate any others in the data. 
In previous work I analysed the factors facilitating collusion across British 
manufacturing industries (defined at the four-digit level of aggregation) in the 1950s. I 
used the capital-labour ratio, K/L, as a proxy for the level of entry costs and two 
different measures of product differentiation: the advertising-sales ratio, ADS, and the 
industry type, distinguishing between producer good, consumer good and 
“intermediate” industries that manufacture significant quantities of both types of goods. 
I did not consider market size, since this is not generally thought to be directly related to 
cartel formation and stability on theoretical or empirical grounds. The mean of lnK/L 
was 1.23 for 71 collusive industries but only 0.64 for 80 competitive ones in 1958. Also, 
62 of the 71 collusive industries but only 49 of the 80 competitive ones had ADS < 1% 
in the mid- to late 1950s. Finally, 49 (11) of the 71 collusive industries versus 29 (47) of 
the 80 competitive ones were manufacturers of producer (consumer) goods. Symeonidis 
(2003) provides more details and an econometric analysis that confirms these 
descriptive statistics. In summary, and consistent with earlier studies, I found that the 
incidence of collusion is facilitated by significant entry costs and product homogeneity. 
The present research suggests that the first and possibly the second of these 
characteristics are associated with a relatively lower welfare loss from collusion. Thus 
an interesting implication of the results of the present paper is that the welfare loss from 
collusive pricing may often be smaller in industries where cartels tend to form than in 
those where collusion is more difficult to achieve and sustain. AC
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Table 1. Initial conditions in industries affected by the 1956 Act and in industries not 
affected 
 
 
 
 
Mean (standard deviation) 
of PCM, 1954 
 
Mean (standard deviation) 
of PCM, 1958 
 
 
Competitive industries  
(n = 52)  
 
All collusive industries  
(n = 36)  
 
Collusive industries 
with LOWCAPINT = 1 
(n = 12) 
 
Collusive industries 
with LOWCAPINT = 0 
(n = 24) 
 
Collusive industries 
with ADV = 1 (n = 7) 
 
Collusive industries 
with ADV = 0 (n = 29) 
 
Collusive industries 
with PRODCON = 1  
(n = 11) 
 
Collusive industries 
with PRODCON = 0  
(n = 25) 
 
Collusive industries 
with MKTSIZE = 1  
(n = 23) 
 
Collusive industries 
with MKTSIZE = 0  
(n = 13) 
 
0.191 (0.071) 
 
 
0.169 (0.047) 
 
 
 
0.184 (0.041) 
 
 
 
0.162 (0.049) 
 
 
 
0.194 (0.049) 
 
 
0.164 (0.045) 
 
 
0.169 (0.047) 
 
 
 
0.191 (0.071) 
 
 
 
0.166 (0.051) 
 
 
 
0.175 (0.039) 
 
0.193 (0.075) 
 
 
0.172 (0.044) 
 
 
 
0.196 (0.038) 
 
 
 
0.159 (0.042) 
 
 
 
0.192 (0.036) 
 
 
0.167 (0.045) 
 
 
0.172 (0.044) 
 
 
 
0.192 (0.075) 
 
 
 
0.164 (0.040) 
 
 
 
0.184 (0.049) 
   
Note: The figures are based on industries with available data for both 1954 and 1958. n 
indicates the number of industries. 
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Table 2. Regression results for lnPCM in industries with a change in competition 
regime. Fixed effects estimation 
ln(K/L) 0.181 
(2.58) 
 0.191 
(2.61) 
0.156 
(1.57) 
 0.179 
(2.42) 
 0.212 
(2.82) 
 0.171 
(2.19) 
0.108 
(1.03) 
 0.194 
(2.42) 
lnNFIRMS -  - -  0.052 
(0.95) 
 -  - -  - 
Y54 -  - -  -  0.087 
(0.95) 
 - -  0.090 
(0.96) 
Y63 0.078 
(2.47) 
 0.162 
(2.43) 
0.217 
(2.96) 
 0.153 
(2.28) 
 0.198 
(2.27) 
 0.167 
(2.43) 
0.228 
(3.02) 
 0.204 
(2.31) 
Y68 0.099 
(2.27) 
 0.156 
(2.29) 
0.219 
(2.64) 
 0.137 
(1.97) 
 0.189 
(2.19) 
 0.172 
(2.46) 
0.246 
(2.86) 
 0.205 
(2.34) 
Y73 0.070 
(1.04) 
 0.245 
(2.36) 
0.317 
(3.29) 
 0.223 
(2.10) 
 0.272 
(2.37) 
 0.265 
(2.41) 
0.356 
(3.52) 
 0.292 
(2.42) 
LOWCAPINTY54 -  - -  -  0.118 
(1.39) 
 - -  0.103 
(1.24) 
LOWCAPINTY63 -  0.102 
(1.55) 
0.172 
(2.23) 
 0.100 
(1.52) 
 0.161 
(1.87) 
 0.099 
(1.49) 
0.158 
(2.00) 
 0.152 
(1.74) 
LOWCAPINTY68 -  0.045 
(0.92) 
0.113 
(1.32) 
 0.040 
(0.81) 
 0.108 
(1.43) 
 0.034 
(0.72) 
0.085 
(0.95) 
 0.091 
(1.22) 
LOWCAPINTY73 -  0.150 
(2.24) 
0.218 
(2.64) 
 0.144 
(2.16) 
 0.213 
(2.42) 
 0.157 
(2.37) 
0.207 
(2.30) 
 0.213 
(2.44) 
ADVY54 -  - -  -  0.020 
(0.30) 
 - -  - 
ADVY63 -  0.047 
(0.94) 
0.060 
(0.78) 
 0.044 
(0.86) 
 0.057 
(0.92) 
 - -  - 
ADVY68 -  0.007 
(0.15) 
0.007 
(0.08) 
 0.010 
(0.22) 
 0.003 
(0.05) 
 - -  - 
ADVY73 -  0.149 
(2.19) 
0.133 
(1.53) 
 0.152 
(2.20) 
 0.141 
(1.88) 
 - -  - 
PRODCONY54 -  - -  -  -  - -  0.070 
(1.08) 
PRODCONY63 -  - -  -  -  0.017 
(0.32) 
0.031 
(0.47) 
 0.016 
(0.28) 
PRODCONY68 -  - -  -  -  0.053 
(1.11) 
0.106 
(1.46) 
 0.084 
(1.65) 
PRODCONY73 -  - -  -  -  0.040 
(0.58) 
0.095 
(1.24) 
 0.070 
(0.97) 
MKTSIZEY54 -  - -  -  0.051 
(0.56) 
 - -  0.029 
(0.32) 
MKTSIZEY63 -  0.096 
(1.42) 
0.125 
(1.62) 
 0.093 
(1.35) 
 0.120 
(1.35) 
 0.090 
(1.32) 
0.103 
(1.32) 
 0.103 
(1.17) 
MKTSIZEY68 -  0.072 
(1.30) 
0.099 
(1.19) 
 0.064 
(1.15) 
 0.097 
(1.22) 
 0.062 
(1.18) 
0.071 
(0.84) 
 0.077 
(1.00) 
MKTSIZEY73 -  0.169 
(2.17) 
0.198 
(2.36) 
 0.160 
(2.01) 
 0.194 
(2.01) 
 0.194 
(2.50) 
0.204 
(2.37) 
 0.209 
(2.18) 
R2 0.42  0.49 0.41  0.49  0.50  0.47 0.39  0.48 
R2LSDV 0.84  0.86 -  0.86  0.86  0.85 -  0.86 
Hausman statistic 
Prob-value 
13.53 
0.001 
 22.64 
0.001 
-  23.08 
0.003 
 23.47 
0.01 
 15.02 
0.02 
-  17.10 
0.01 
Wooldridge test 
Prob-value 
2.63 
0.114 
 4.43 
0.042 
-  4.39 
0.043 
 3.95 
0.055 
 4.68 
0.037 
-  3.92 
0.056 
AR(1) -  - 0.13  -  -  - 0.14  - 
No. of industries 
No. of observations 
36 
178 
 36 
178 
36 
142 
 36 
178 
 36 
178 
 36 
178 
36 
142 
 36 
178 
Notes: Columns 1-2, 4-6 and 8: fixed effects estimation, t-statistics based on robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Columns 3 and 7: fixed effects estimation with AR(1) disturbances, t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Robustness checks for industries with a change in competition regime. Fixed effects 
estimation 
 Dep. variable: PCM  Dependent. variable: lnPCM 
ln(K/L) 0.039 
(2.96) 
 0.032 
(2.55) 
 0.181 
(2.31) 
 0.139 
(1.71) 
0.088 
(0.76) 
 0.155 
(2.09) 
0.142 
(1.42) 
Y54 0.011 
(0.78) 
 -  0.103 
(1.05) 
 - -  - - 
Y63 0.032 
(2.34) 
 0.028 
(2.51) 
 0.232 
(2.55) 
 0.190 
(2.72) 
0.255 
(3.17) 
 0.188 
(2.53) 
0.239 
(3.16) 
Y68 0.029 
(2.25) 
 0.028 
(2.61) 
 0.216 
(2.39) 
 0.188 
(2.61) 
0.262 
(2.89) 
 0.217 
(2.80) 
0.272 
(2.99) 
Y73 0.049 
(2.42) 
 0.049 
(2.46) 
 0.305 
(2.54) 
 0.293 
(2.58) 
0.382 
(3.60) 
 0.408 
(3.10) 
0.481 
(3.54) 
LOWCAPINTY54 0.017 
(1.21) 
 -  0.135 
(1.43) 
 - -  - - 
LOWCAPINTY63 0.021 
(1.46) 
 0.013 
(1.02) 
 0.221 
(2.42) 
 0.153 
(2.12) 
0.217 
(2.40) 
 0.097 
(1.39) 
0.165 
(2.15) 
LOWCAPINTY68 0.010 
(0.79) 
 0.002 
(0.24) 
 0.138 
(1.64) 
 0.048 
(0.90) 
0.105 
(1.02) 
 0.032 
(0.64) 
0.095 
(1.11) 
LOWCAPINTY73 0.034 
(2.17) 
 0.026 
(2.01) 
 0.227 
(2.30) 
 0.167 
(2.16) 
0.221 
(2.08) 
 0.146 
(2.18) 
0.213 
(2.51) 
ADVY54 0.004 
(0.31) 
 -  0.031 
(0.45) 
 - -  - - 
ADVY63 0.019 
(1.74) 
 -  0.076 
(1.16) 
 - -  0.048 
(0.92) 
0.062 
0.80) 
ADVY68 0.011 
(1.07) 
 -  0.016 
(0.27) 
 - -  0.003 
(0.07) 
0.019 
(0.23) 
ADVY73 0.016 
(1.01) 
 -  0.131 
(1.70) 
 - -  0.131 
(1.94) 
0.115 
(1.30) 
PRODCONY63 -  0.007 
(0.82) 
 -  0.032 
(0.57) 
0.012 
(0.18) 
 - - 
PRODCONY68 -  0.008 
(1.01) 
 -  0.052 
(1.00) 
0.101 
(1.29) 
 - - 
PRODCONY73 -  0.002 
(0.22) 
 -  0.042 
(0.57) 
0.095 
(1.16) 
 - - 
MKTSIZEY54 0.002 
(0.15) 
 -  0.084 
(0.84) 
 - -  - - 
MKTSIZEY63 0.021 
(1.48) 
 0.018 
(1.56) 
 0.154 
(1.63) 
 0.105 
(1.44) 
0.133 
(1.53) 
 0.091 
(1.27) 
0.117 
(1.51) 
MKTSIZEY68 0.016 
(1.29) 
 0.011 
(1.33) 
 0.117 
(1.34) 
 0.058 
(0.97) 
0.081 
(0.85) 
 0.052 
(0.93) 
0.074 
(0.88) 
MKTSIZEY73 0.041 
(2.45) 
 0.043 
(3.04) 
 0.209 
(1.95) 
 0.194 
(2.19) 
0.216 
(2.22) 
 0.157 
(1.97) 
0.179 
(2.13) 
lnSALES -  -  -  - -  0.103 
(1.46) 
0.080 
(0.87) 
lnSIZE -  -  -  - -  0.069 
(0.72) 
0.096 
(0.73) 
lnUNION -  -  -  - -  0.351 
(1.79) 
0.427 
(1.72) 
R2 0.53  0.51  0.48  0.45 0.39  0.50 0.44 
R2LSDV 0.87  0.86  0.86  0.85 -  0.86 - 
Hausman statistic 
Prob-value 
23.05 
0.001 
 14.66 
0.02 
 19.63 
0.002 
 12.18 
0.03 
-  22.76 
0.007 
- 
Wooldridge test 
Prob-value 
2.83 
0.101 
 3.54 
0.068 
 3.53 
0.069 
 4.21 
0.048 
-  4.75 
0.036 
- 
AR(1) -  -  -  - 0.14  - 0.12 
No. of industries 
No. of observations 
36 
178 
 36 
178 
 33 
164 
 33 
164 
33 
131 
 36 
178 
36 
142 
Notes: Columns 1-2, 3-4 and 6: fixed effects estimation, t-statistics based on robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Columns 5 and 7: fixed effects estimation with AR(1) disturbances, t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Regression results for lnPCM in competitive industries. Random effects 
estimation 
 
ln(K/L) 0.073 
(2.00) 
 0.191 
(2.58) 
 0.068 
(1.99) 
 0.092 
(2.57) 
lnNFIRMS -  -  0.058 
(1.21) 
 - 
Y63 0.141 
(6.43) 
 0.099 
(2.14) 
 0.087 
(1.92) 
 0.095 
(2.14) 
Y68 0.127 
(3.98) 
 0.009 
(0.14) 
 0.001 
(0.01) 
 0.002 
(0.04) 
Y73 0.102 
(2.28) 
 0.046 
(0.51) 
 0.052 
(0.59) 
 0.093 
(1.05) 
LOWCAPINTY63 -  0.065 
(1.43) 
 0.071 
(1.58) 
 0.072 
(1.40) 
LOWCAPINTY68 -  0.153 
(2.60) 
 0.157 
(2.71) 
 0.165 
(2.53) 
LOWCAPINTY73 -  0.194 
(2.77) 
 0.204 
(2.93) 
 0.186 
(2.57) 
ADVY63 -  0.018 
(0.48) 
 0.023 
(0.62) 
 - 
ADVY68 -  0.034 
(0.66) 
 0.042 
(0.86) 
 - 
ADVY73 -  0.021 
(0.37) 
 0.025 
(0.42) 
 - 
PRODCONY63 -  -  -  0.019 
(0.48) 
PRODCONY68 -  -  -  0.030 
(0.56) 
PRODCONY73 -  -  -  0.069 
(1.12) 
MKTSIZEY63 -  0.013 
(0.35) 
 0.024 
(0.63) 
 0.018 
(0.47) 
MKTSIZEY68   0.073 
(1.46) 
 0.086 
(1.78) 
 0.081 
(1.59) 
MKTSIZEY73 -  0.063 
(1.02) 
 0.078 
(1.28) 
 0.081 
(1.35) 
Constant 1.77 
(36.65) 
 1.78 
(36.80) 
 1.49 
(5.92) 
 1.78 
(36.43) 
R2 0.29  0.37  0.37  0.38 
Hausman statistic 
Prob-value 
0.11 
0.95 
 12.85 
0.03 
 11.61 
0.07 
 7.39 
0.19 
No. of industries 
No. of observations 
55 
272 
 55 
272 
 55 
272 
 55 
272 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 1: List of collusive industries with a change of competition regime 
 
Industry LOWCAPINT ADV PRODCON MKTSIZE 
grain milling 
 
bread and flour confectionery 
 
biscuits 
 
milk and milk products 
 
cocoa, chocolate and sugar 
confectionery 
 
paint 
 
surgical bandages and sanitary 
towels 
 
steel tubes 
 
iron castings 
 
aluminium and aluminium alloys 
 
copper, brass and other copper 
alloys 
 
industrial engines 
 
industrial plant and steelwork 
 
surgical instruments and 
appliances 
 
electrical machinery  
 
insulated wires and cables 
 
electrical appliances primarily for 
domestic use 
 
batteries and accumulators 
 
electric lamps, electric light 
fittings and wiring accessories 
 
hand tools and implements 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
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wire and wire manufactures 
 
metal hollow-ware 
 
miscellaneous metal goods 
 
spinning and doubling on the 
cotton and flax systems 
 
jute 
 
rope, twine and net 
 
carpets 
 
canvas goods and sacks 
 
textile finishing 
 
asbestos manufactures 
 
refractory goods 
 
building bricks and other non-
refractory goods 
 
pottery 
 
miscellaneous building materials 
and mineral products 
 
paper and board 
 
linoleum, plastics floor covering, 
leathercloth 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
0 
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APPENDIX 2: Data sources and construction of variables 
 
The data sources for competition were described in the text. Data on net output, sales 
revenue, wages and salaries, and employment were obtained from the industry reports 
of the Census of Production (various years). The figures are for all firms with at least 25 
employees. Small corrections were sometimes made to ensure comparability over time. 
Estimates of capital stock, defined as plant and machinery, at the three-digit 
level of aggregation are available from O’Mahony and Oulton (1990). These are net 
stock estimates constructed on the assumption of fixed and “short” asset lives and 
exponential depreciation rates. For a few cases where employment data were available 
at a more disaggregated level, I adjusted the O’Mahony and Oulton capital stock 
estimates on the basis of Census of Production data on the fraction of investment on 
plant and machinery accounted for by each “principal product” within any given three-
digit industry.  
Data on manufacturers' advertising expenditure in the UK for 1958 were 
taken from the Statistical Review of Press and TV Advertising. The figures were 
adjusted to correct for the underreporting of press advertising and the failure to take 
into account discounts for TV advertising and costs of production of advertisements. 
The Statistical Review contains information mostly for consumer good industries; 
however, nearly all the industries for which data are not reported could be easily 
classified as low-advertising industries. 
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
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